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W. E. WILLIAMS, Respondent, v. GLEN E. REED et al., 
Defendants; ROBERT M. CAIRNS et al., Appellants. 
[1] Negotiable Instruments - Presumptions - Consideration. 
Where defendants appear as ordinary joint makers of a prom-
issory note, it "is deemed prima facie to have been issued for 
a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature 
appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value" 
( Civ. Code, § 3105), which means that each defendant is 
presumed to have received value from the loan of money made 
by plaintiff payee; a presumption of consideration arose, and 
it is also presumed that the note "was given or endorsed for a 
sufficient consideration" (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 21) 
and that "there was a good and sufficient consideration for 
a written contract." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 39.) 
[2] Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Where Evidence on One 
Side Consists of Presumption.-The presumption that a note 
is supported by a consideration is evidence to be weighed 
against a maker's testimony that he did not receive considera-
tion, and with this conflict the trial court's finding that a 
consideration passed should not be disturbed. 
[3] Negotiable Instruments-Evidence-Accommodation Makers. 
-Evidence that defendant makers of a promissory note were 
to receive real benefits from a loan made by plaintiff payee, 
rather than a mere motive on their part of wanting to help a 
codefendant, support an inference that defendants were to 
receive value from the loan and thus were not accommodation 
makers. 
[4] Election of Remedies-What Amounts to Election.-Where a 
payee's agreement to accept, in settlement of old notes, a cer-
tain sum of money to be paid in full by a designated date is 
not a novation and does not release the obligor's comakers on 
the original notes, the mere reduction of the new obligation 
to judgment is not an election which estops the payee from 
maintaining an action on the original obligation, since such 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Bills and Notes, § 216; Am.Jur., Bills and 
Notes, § 1002 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1) Negotiable Instruments, § 216; [21 
Appeal and Error, § 1290; [3] Negotiable Instruments, § 266; [ 4] 
Election of Remedies, § 7; [ 5] Negotiable Instruments, § 20; [ 6, 8) 
Parties, § 15; [7, 9] Judgments, § 345.1; [10] Chattel Mortgages, 
§ 69; [11, 12] Mortgages, § 299; [13] Interest, § 29; [14] Inter-
est, § 34. 
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judgment does not the payee's accept the 
agreed sum of money in satisfaction of the notes. 
[5] Negotiable Instruments-Construction-Joint and Several Ob-
Iigations.-Where a note signed by several defendants is in 
the form of a promise made in the singular number and 
executed by each defendant, it is presumed that the promise 
is joint and several. (Civ. Code, §§ 1660, 3098, subd. (7).) 
[6] Parties-.Joinder.-Joint obligors on the same contract are 
indispensable parties; they may not be sued separately. 
[7] Judgments-Res Judicata-Judgment Against Joint Obligors. 
-A judgment obtained in a separate action against one of 
several joint obligors bars an action against the others. 
[8] Parties-Joinder.-When an obligation is joint and severn!, 
it is not nonjoinder to sue one obligor alone. 
[9] Judgments-Res Judicata-Judgment Against Joint and Sev-
eral Obligors.-Except for the possible effect of Code Civ. 
Proc., § 726, providing that there can be but one form of 
action for recovery of a debt secured by a mortgage, a judg-
ment obtained against one maker of joint and several promis-
sory notes in a separate action against him would not preclude 
the payee from bringing subsequent actions against the obli-
gor's comakers. 
[10] Chattel Mortgages-Foreclosure-Rights and Remedies.-A 
payee who agrees with one signer to accept, in settlement of 
old notes, a certain sum of money to be paid in full by a 
designated date does not waive the security of a chattel 
mortgage securing such notes and thereby lose his right to 
proceed against cosigners, where such settlement agreement 
does not operate as a novation cancelling the original notes 
and ehattel mortgage. 
[11] Mortgages- Remedies- Restriction to Foreclosure.- Civ. 
Code, 2953, prohibiting a borrower from waiving the benefit 
of a resort to mortgage security at the time of or in connec-
tion with making the loan or execution of the mortgage, does 
not preclude him from subsequently waiving the rights and 
privileges conferred on him by Code Civ. Proc., § 726, pre-
scribing foreclosure as the one form of remedy for recovery of 
a debt secured by a mortgage. 
[12] Id.- Remedies- Restriction to Foreclosure.- The mere 
recordation of a judgment obtained against one joint and 
several maker of promissory notes in a separate action against 
him on another agreement, and issuance but not levy of 
execution, would not estop the payee from claiming any 
mortgage interest in the property and thereby preclude him 
[8] See Cal.Jur., Parties, § 17; Am.Jur., Parties, § 39. 
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against the maker's 
Interest-Usury-Elements.--\Vhen a transaction violates the 
usury law the intent of the parties is immaterial, nor is it 
material that the borrower rather than the lender took the 
initiative in the transaction. 
Id.-Usury-Effect.-Where plaintifT brought an action on 
two promissory notes constituting a transaction, one 
for $30,000 bearing 5 per cent interest, the other for $10,000, 
and the $10,000 note was clearly usurious because given as a 
"bonus" for the $30,000 loan, he lost the right to claim or 
collect interest in any amount; the whole transaction was 
tainted by usury, and it was immaterial that plaintiff dis-
missed the portion of his action on the $10,000 note. 
APPEAl; from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Contra Costa County. Hugh H. Donovau, ,Judge. ,Judg-
ment affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Action to enforce payment of promissory notes alH1 to fore-
dose a chattel mortgage given as security. Judgment for 
plaintiff affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Athearn, Chandler & Hoffman, F. G. Athearn, IJeigh 
Athearn, Theodore P. Lambros, Carlson, Collins, Gordon & 
Bold and Roscoe E. Jordan for Appellants. 
Herron & Winn and John ·wynne Herron for Hespondent. 
CAR'l'ER, J.-'l'his is an appeal by defendants Arvidson, 
Carroll and Cairns, makers (with Reed who does not appeal) 
of a $30,000 promissory note, from a deficiency judgment, 
after sale under a securing chattel mortgage, in favor of 
plaintiff, payee of the note. 
Two negotiable notes, one for $30,000, bearing 5 per cent 
interest, and the other for $10,000, were dated June 14, 1950. 
The first became due in 60 days and the second on Decem-
ber 14, 1950, and named all the makers as such with plaintiff 
as payee. They recited that "I" promise to pay the principal 
and interest. The notes were secured by a chattel mortgagt' 
executed by Heed covering property owned by him. After 
this case was reversed on an appeal by plaintiff from a sum-
mary judgment for all the makers but Reed, who defaulted 
(Williams v. Reed, 113 Cal.App.2d 195 [248 P.2d 147]), 
plaintiff dismissed the portion of the action pertaining to 
the $10,000 note and the trial proceeded on the $30,000 note. 
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The $10,000 note was given as a ''bonus'' for the $30,000 
loan, and was, therefore, usurious, hence the action thereon 
was dismissed. This action was commenced to foreclose the 
chattel mortgage and for a deficiency judgment for the bal-
ance due; the amount realized at the foreclosure sale ($687) 
was credited on the note. The judgment awarded interest 
and attorney's fees (provided for in the note) on the $30,000 
note. Soon after the maturity of the notes, and on October 12, 
1950, an agreement with reference to the notes was made 
between plaintiff and Heed and his wife. Before the instant 
action was commenced, plaintiff obtained judgment against 
Heed on that agreement, but the judgment has not been paid 
or satisfied. 
The main defenses of defendants-makers, except Reed, 
were that the agreement made October 12, 1950, between 
Reed and his wife and plaintiff, wherein plaintiff agreed to 
accept and Reed to pay $35,000 on October 28, 1950, to 
discharge the two notes which had in effect extended the 
time for payment two and one-half months on the $30,000 
note, was a novation-a substitute for the notes, thus exon-
erating them; that they were accommodation makers only, 
having received no value, and under section 3110 of the Civil 
Code,1 were liable only as sureties, and the October 12th 
agreement freed them from liability because it changed the 
obligation (see Civ. Code, §§ 2819, 2822) ; that the judgment 
for plaintiff in his action on the agreement achieved the same 
results and constituted an election of remedies; that the action 
will not lie because of failure to comply with section 726 
of the Code of Civil Procedure.2 The trial court found against 
all of these contentions. 
Several matters are settled by the former decision on 
appeal. ( W illiarns v. Reed, supra, 113 Cal.App.2d 195.) 
Reserving the question of whether defendants (other than 
Reed) were accommodation makers and entitled to the appli-
cation of surety law which was said to be a factual question, 
it was held that the October 12th agreement showed no intent 
"'An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as 
maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, 
and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such 
a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwith-
standing such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him 
to be only an accommodation party." (Civ. Code, § 3110.) 
2
'' There can be but one form of action for the recovery of any debt, 
or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real or 
personal property, which action must be in accordance with the provi-
sions of this chapter .•.. " (Code Civ. Proc., § 726.) 
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on its face for novation releasing such defendants; that the 
judgment on that agreement, there being no execution, was 
not an election which estopped plaintiff; that the security of 
the chattel mortgage was not waived to the prejudice of those 
defendants to render them not liable; that even if the agree-
ment was a novation as to Reed it would not release the other 
defendants; and that the right of action was not controlled 
by section 726 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The opinion 
of the court closed with the statement that it did not intend 
to foreclose the determination of any issue of fact including 
novation. 
Defendant Cairns (the other defendants filed no brief but 
join in Cairns' brief) contends that he was an accommodation 
maker, and under the laws of suretyship as applied to him, 
the October 12th agreement changed the obligation and re-
leased him from liability.3 Assuming an accommodation 
maker is in such position, the basic question is whether there 
is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that 
he and the other defendants were not aecommodation makers 
because they received value. It will be reealled that under 
section 3110 of the Civil Code, supra, a maker is not an 
accommodation one unless he did not receive value for sign-
ing the instrument, and defendant asserts that the value 
must have been from the consideration for the note-from 
the payee (plaintiff) rather than from Reed, the accommo-
dated maker, for lending his name to the instrument (citing 
Britton, Bills and Notes (1943), p. 365; 11 C.J.S., Bills and 
Notes, § 742). Accepting the foregoing premise as correct, 
it appears that the evidence is sufficient as to all the de-
fendants. 
[1] In the first place it should be observed that the 
defendants appear as ordinary joint makers of a negotiable 
note and thus ''Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima 
facie to have been issued for a valuable eonsideration; and 
every person whose signature appears thereon to have become 
a party thereto for value.'' ( Civ. Code, § 3105.) This 
clearly means that everyone who appeared to be a party to 
the instrument (defendants appeared as makers here) was 
"There is a conflict of authority as to whether an accommodation 
maker of a negotiable instrument is in the position of a surety and 
has all the defenses available to a surety (see Mortgage Guarantee Co. 
v. Chotiner, 8 Cal.2d 110 [64 P.2d 138, 108 A.L.R. 1080]; Britton, 
Bills and Notes, p. 1121 et seq.; 2 A.L.R.2d 260). 
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presumed to have received value from the loan of money 
made by the plaintiff payee ; a presumption of consideration 
arose (Weiss v. First Sav. Bank, 28 Cal.App.2d 140, 146 
[82 P.2d 45, 83 P.2d 35]). Among the presumptions also 
is the rebuttable one ''That a promissory note or bill of 
exchange was given or endorsed for a sufficient consideration'' 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. (21)), and "That there was 
a good and sufficient consideration for a written contract" 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. ( 39)). [2] '' he writing 
[promissory note] itself carries the presumption of consid-
eration which is evidence to be weighed against this defend-
ant's testimony. With this conflict, the finding of the trial 
court that a consideration passed should not be disturbed.'' 
(Rodaba1lgh v. Kmrffrnan, 53 Cal.App. 676, 679 [200 P. 747] ; 
see also Moore v. Gould, 151 Oa1. 723, 726 [91 P. 616] ; Pacific 
Portland Cement Co., Consol. v. Reinecke, 30 Cal.App. 501 
[158 P. 1041] ; Ellington v. Ft·eer, 111 Cal.App. 651 [295 
P. 857].) Hence it follows that there was a presump-
tion that defendants all received value from the plaintiff's 
loan of money. [3] Moreover, it may be inferred from the 
evidence that defendants received some benefit from the loan. 
Defendants and Reed had known each other for some time 
prior to the execution of the note and were enjoying business 
relations. Reed agreed to assist them in organizing various 
projects and foundations in which they were interested. 
rrhose projects were beneficial to defendants, and Reed pur-
ported to be able to obtain funds for them from eastern 
capital. Defendant Cairns testified that plaintiff was assist-
ing him in organizing Cairns' Agricultural Research Foun-
dation to study and develop plant nutrition and soil in 
which he had long been interested; that the foundation was 
not philanthropic; that he \vould realize gains from it by 
selling products from the research; that he had no funds 
to finance such a foundation, but Reed told him he could 
obtain them from the East and advance the project for him; 
that he would install an irrigation system on Reed's ranch 
for the latter's services in obtaining finances for the founda-
tion; that he wanted Reed to get the $30,000 for his financial 
difficulties so he could continue performing for his interests 
in the foundation; that he said nothing when he signed the 
note concerning the capacity in which he signed it, indicating 
that he was an ordinary comaker. Plaintiff testified (Cairns 
also) that before Cairns signed the note he telephoned Reed 
to see if time enough was allowed for repayment and if it 
WILLIAMS v. REED 
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all indicating Cairns' interest m Reed receiving 
loan to beneflt Cairns. 
Reed testified by deposition, ''There is no question but that 
all three of these men-and I am referring to .Arvidson, 
and Cairns-were to benefit, either directly or in-
from the $30,000.00 loan; is that correct? .ANSWER: 
That is right"; that an automobile Reed got from Cairns was 
in part paymellt for his services; that he had "obligations" 
on his ranch that must be met and the ranch was to go into 
the defendants' foundations; that "In addition, prior to 
June 14, 1950, I had formed for Carroll and .Arvidson and 
the company, which is known as \Vest Coast Industrial En-
This operating company was set up with Carroll 
and defendant .Arvidson as officers and managers. In addi-
on or about June 14, 1950, I had created an agricultural 
research foundation for defendant Robert M. Cairns and 
also an operation company for this foundation. Defendant 
Cairns and his wife were officers in said organization. These 
organizations were designed so that a profit would be made 
by defendants Carroll, Arvidson and Cairns in accordance 
with their duties as officers of organization. .At the time of 
the execution of the subject notes, there was yet no work to 
be clone by me to get said foundation and operating company 
in operation. In addition, money was needed to get said 
organization into operation. On June 14, 1950, I had an 
interest in a valuable farm at Walnut Creek, which interest 
I had acquired by means of a written contract of sale. It 
was agreed by the defendants and myself that said farm would 
become an asset of the foundation and operating company. 
However, on June 14, 1950, at the time said notes were 
executed I was in default on the contract of sale and money 
was borrowed by all of us from plaintiff Williams to make 
payments due on the farm." 
The foregoing is sufficient from which the trial court 
could infer that all the defendants realized or were to receive 
value from the loan of the money and thus were not accom-
modation makers. There ·were real benefits to be received by 
defendants from the loan transaction, rather than a mere 
motive on their part of wanting to help Reed. There is evi-
dence to the contrary to the effect that the $30,000 was only 
for Reed's personal benefit but that merely creates a conflict . 
.At least with the presumption of valuable consideration 
present, the evidence which tends to support it sufficiently 
contradicts the contrary evidence. In Gardiner v. Holcomb, 
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82 Cal.App. 342, 353 [255 P. 523], it is said: "While a 
party's intent may be to aid a maker of a note by lending 
his credit, if he seeks to accomplish thereby legitimate objects 
of his own and not simply to aid the maker the act is not 
for aecommodation." (See also Irwin v. Colbttrn, 56 Cal. 
App. 41 [204 P. 551].) 
[ 4] Defendants assert there was an "election of rights" 
Ly plaintiff in suing and obtaining judgment against Reed 
on the October 12th agreement, recording an abstract of the 
judgment, and having a writ of execution issue (no levy of 
the writ was made and nothing was realized from it) which 
forecloses the instant action of foreclosure on the notes and 
chattel mortgage; they concede that the October 12th agree-
ment was not, as found by the trial court, a novation. That 
contention in part was answered by the former appeal in 
this case when the judgment had been obtained but no execu-
tion had been issued. The court there said: ''Was the 
reduction of Reed's October, 1950, obligat,ion to judgment 
an election which estops plaintiff f1·om maintaining the pres-
ent action? If the October, 1950, agreement was not a nova-
tion and did not release Reed's co makers on the original notes, 
it is difficult to see how the mere reduction of Reed's October 
obligation to judgment (a judgment not yet satisfied in whole 
or in part) could give that obligation a different effect. In 
October Reed promised to pay plaintiff a certain sum of 
money. In November the court found that Reed for a valu-
able consideration promised to pay plaintiff that sum of 
money, and decreed that plaintiff have judgment against Reed 
for that amount of money. That judgment does not import 
any new factor into the situation. It affords plaintiff a better 
muniment of title to Reed's October promise to pay. It does 
not modify plaintiff's promise to accept that amount of 
money, and nothing but money (no mere added muniment 
of title to Reed's promise) in satisfaction of the original 
notes of June, 1950. 
[5] "The parties agree that upon the basis of the record 
before us the obligations of the defendants as comakers of the 
original notes were joint and several. Each note was in the 
form of a promise made in the singular number and executed 
by each of the defendants. In such a case there is a presump-
tion that the promise is joint and several ( Civ. Code, §§ 1660, 
3098, subd. (7)). 
''Reed's co makers claim that in such a case the bringing 
of an action against one of the makers (Reed) without join-
19571 vVrLr,rAllrs v. RrcED 65 
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the others, and obtaining jw1gmcnt against him alone, 
bars the plaintiff from laiPt' suing any of the others in respect 
to that obligation. They cite cases from other jurisdictions, 
none from California. Those cases are not applicable. Three 
of them involved joint, not joint and several, obligations: 
Fleming v. Ross ( 1906), 225 Ill. 149 [ 80 N.E. 92, 8 Ann. 
Cas. 314]; JJ1organ v. Eduar (1929), 107 W.Va. 536 [149 
S.E. 606]; and Pedderson v. Goode (19:14), 112 Colo. 38 [145 
P.2d 981]. The remaining (·ase, Taylor v. Sartorious (1908), 
135l\1o.App. 23 [108 S.\V. 1089], involve(1 a joint and several 
obligation. 'l'he court recognized that joint and several 
obligors may be sued separately but held that those later 
sued get the benefit of a judgment favorable to the obligor first 
sued, to the extent that he successfully defended. [6] It is 
true in most jurisdictions, including California, that joint 
obligors upon the same eontract are indispensable parties. 
They may not be sued separately [eitations]. [7] If judg-
ment is obtained in a separate action against one, it bars an 
adiou against the others. [Citation.] [8] When the obliga-
tion is joint and several, it is not nonjoinder to sue one alone 
ieitations]. The same is true of an aetion against one or more 
and less than all of a number of persons jointly and severally 
obligated as tort feasors. In such a ease the judgment obtained 
against one is not a bar to an action against the remaining 
joint and several obligors. 'Nothing short of satisfaction in 
some form constitutes a bar ... ' ( Grwndel v. Union Iron 
Works, 127 Cal. 438, 442 [59 P. 826, 78 Am.St.Rep. 75, 47 
hR.A. 467] .) [Citations.] That being so in respect to joint 
and several tort obligors under a contract. . . . [9] Accord-
ingly, but for the possible effect of section 726 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, a mere judgment against Reed in a separate 
aetion against him upon the original notes would not preclude 
plaintiff from bringing subsequent actions against Reed's 
eo makers. 
"But plaintiff's former action was not brought upon the 
original notes. It was brought against Reed upon his sep-
arate agreement of Oetober, 1950, to which none of the other 
note makers was a party." (Emphasis added; Williams v. 
Reed, S1lpra, 113 Cal.App.2d 195, 203.) The added facts 
that a writ of execution was obtained and the judgment was 
recorded add nothing to the picture; defendants did not 
change their position in reliance thereon. In fact, if any-
thing they were possibly benefited by a partial exhaustion 
48 C.2d-3 
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of rights against Heed and, as said on the former appeal, 
quoted supra, "Nothing short of satisfaction in some form 
constitutes a bar" against an action against the comakers. 
[10] In connection with this same argument defendants 
rely on section 726 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Sttpra, and 
say the right of action for a deficiency after sale under the 
chattel mortgage, which was the only action that could be 
brought, was lost because of the judgment on the October 
12th agreement, and the issuance of execution, and recording 
of the judgment. This also is in part answered on the former 
appeal, the court stating: "Has the plaintiff waived the 
security of the chattel mortgage to the prejttdice of the rights 
of Reed's cosigners and thereby lost his right to proceed 
against them? Reed's cosigners direct attention to section 
726 of the Code of Civil Procedure which declares that 
' [ t] here can be but one form of action for the recovery of 
any debt, or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage 
upon real or personal property, which action must be in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this chapter,' and prescribes 
the circumstances under which a deficiency judgment may 
be obtained and the manner and method of determining the 
amount of such judgment. They then claim that plaintiff 
has disabled himself from resorting to the security of the 
chattel mortgage and has thereby prevented himself from 
getting a deficiency or personal judgment against them. 
"This came about, they say, because the October, 1950, 
agreement with Reed operated as a novation which cancelled 
the original notes and as a necessary consequence extinguished 
the chattel mortgage. This argument lacks merit for the 
reason, as we have seen, no novation occurred by the mere 
execution of the October, 1950, agreement. 
"They further contend that 'even if no novation had been 
entered into, and the plaintiff had brought this action ... 
against Reed alone on the notes and recovered judgment, the 
plaintiff would have been only an unsecured judgment 
creditor, and the lien of the mortgage would have been lost.' 
\Vhether or not such a suit by plaintiff reduced to judgment 
would have lost him the mortgage seems immaterial. He did 
not bring an action on the 'notes.' He brought an action on 
the October, 1950, agreement. 
"Moreover, plaintiff's former action against Reed was 
upon an agreement susceptible to the interpretation that Reed 
eonfessed judgment while waiving as to himself the benefit 
of prior resort to the mortgage security and yet keeping the 
Fcb.1957] WILLIAMS V. REED 
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alive and available for the benefit of plaintiff and 
Heed's cosigners. [11] The prohibition against Reed's mak-
any such waiver at the time of or in connection with the 
of the loan and the execution of the mortgage (Civ. 
§ 2953) signifies authority in Reed later to waive thE' 
or privil0ges conferred upon him by section 726 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. (See Salter v. Ulrich, 22 Cal.2d 263, 
266-267 [138 P.2d 7, 146 .A.hR. 1344] .) If after obtaining 
against Reed in the former action, plaintiff had 
lr:viecl execution against the mortgaged property, bought that 
property upon the execution sale, and were now relying 7tpon 
the title th7lS acq1tired (as was done by the secured creditor in 
the Salter case) plaintiff might find that he had destroyed the 
mortgage security or had estopped himself from claiming 
any mortgage interest in that property and thereby be pre-
cluded from obtaining a deficiency judgment against Reed's 
eosigners. But plaintiff has not done that. There is nothing 
in the record before us to indicate that he has even taken 
out a writ of execution to enforce the judgment in the former 
action." (Emphasis added; Williams v. Reed, supra, 113 Cal. 
App.2d ] !)5, 205.) [12] We fail to see how the mere recor--
dation of the judgment and issuance but not levy of execution 
changes that reasoning. 
Finally, defendants claim that the $10,000 and $30,000 
notes were part of the same transaction (contrary to the 
trial court's findings) in which the plaintiff gave only $30,000 
and the $10,000 was usnrious4 interest; that hence the 5 per 
eent interest provided for in the $30,000 note should not have 
been allowed by the judgment because the whole transaction ifl 
tainted with usury. There can be no question that all the 
eyidence including plaintiff's is one way, namely, that the 
$10,000 note was given as a "bonus" or "finder's fee" for 
the loan of $30,000 and nothing else, and was part of the loan 
transaction. Plaintiff makes no real contention that the bonus 
would not constitute usurious interest (see In re Fuller, 15 
'"The rate of interest upon the loan or forbearance of any money. 
goods or things in action, or on accounts after demand or judgment 
reJHlercd in any court of the State, shall he 7 per cent per annum but 
it shall be competent for the parties to any loan or forbearance of any 
goods or things in action to contract in writing for a rate of 
not exceeding 10 per con t per annum. 
''No person. association, copartnership or corporation shall by charg-
ing any fee, bonus, commission. discount or other compensation receive 
from a borrower more than 10 per cent per annum upon any loan or 
forhcarance of any money, goods or things in action.'' (Cal. Const., 
art. XX, ~· 22; see also Stats. 1919, p. LXXXIII, as amended.) 
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Cal.2d 425, 434 [102 P.2d 321]; .Anderson v. Lee, 103 Cal. 
App.2d 24 [228 P.2d 613] ; Brown v. Cardoza, 67 Cal.App.2d 
187 [153 P.2d 767] ; P,acific Finance Corp. v. Crane, 131 
Cal.App.2d 399 [280 P.2d 502]). [13] When the transaction 
violates the usury law the intent of neither of the parties is 
material (Martin v. Ktwhler, 212 Cal. 536 [299 P. 52]) nor 
is it material that the borrower rather than the lender took 
the initiative in the transaction (Martin v . .Ajax Const. Co., 
] 24 Cal.App.2d 425 [269 P.2d 132]). [14] Plaintiff claims, 
how·ever, that since he dismissed his action on the $10,000 
note and the 5 per cent interest specified in the $30,000 is 
not usurious, he is entitled to the latter interest as awarded 
by the judgment. In Moore v. Rttssell, 114 Cal.App. 634, 641 
[300 P. 479], the court said: "The note in controversy having 
provided for the payment of $750 bonus and a fiat interest 
at seven per cent was plainly usurious. Thus tainted the 
plaintiff lost the right to claim or collect interest in any 
amount." (Emphasis added; see also Paillet v. Vroman, 52 
Cal.App.2d 297, 305 [126 P.2d 419]; Jones v. Dickerman, 114 
Cal.App. 357, 361 [300 P. 135]; Hrn:ncs v. CommerciallJJortg. 
Co., 200 Cal. 609, 617, 621, 622 [254 P. 956, 255 P. 805, 53 
A.L.R. 725]; 91 C.,T.S., Usury, §§56, 58.) Since there is a 
single transaction and the whole was tainted by the usury, 
it can make no difference that plaintiff dismissed the portion 
of his action on the $10,000 note. 
The judgment, insofar as it awards interest, is reversed; 
in all other respects it is affirmed. Each party shall bear 
his own costs on this appeal. 
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, ,T., 'rraynor, ,J., Schauer, ,J., Spence, 
J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
